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Heterogeneity in time discounting may reinforce the existing barriers to save and invest faced 
by rural populations in developing countries. We elicit a subjective discount rate for a varied 
sample of Ugandan villagers. In accordance with other studies, we have found the discount 
rate to decrease with education. We examine this correlation further by testing the causal 
effect of education and exploit two different sources of its variation: school frequency across 
villages and the number of the respondents’ school-going years that overlap with the era of 
the dictator Idi Amin’s rule. For men, we find that education has a significant impact on their 
discount rate, similar in magnitude for both types of instruments and robust to observable 
characteristics. This finding highlights the importance of education in development. 
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The question why there is not more indigenous saving and investment in less 
developed countries lies at the core of many debates among development economists. 
Goldstein and Udry (1999) estimated rate of return to the production of pineapple in Ghana to 
be in excess of 1,200%. However, very few people decided to grow pineapple even though 
doing so requires only a moderate initial investment which could be covered by a loan 
collateralized by the farmers’ land. Likewise, in Kenya, Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2006) 
found that less than 20% of maize farmers in the area in which they conducted field trials on 
the profitability of fertilizer report that they had used fertilizer, despite an estimated rate of 
return in excess of 150%. The limited responsiveness to high marginal product in poor 
countries is usually attributed to market failures of various kinds (for a survey see Banerjee 
and Duflo 2004). Recently, growing attention has been directed towards behavioral issues 
and psychological barriers that limit saving and investment decisions not by affecting the 
constraints, but by changing the decision-making process (Duflo 2006; Mullainathan 2005).   
An interaction between time discounting and individual characteristics such as 
education or wealth could also partially explain these observations. However, as noted by 
Anderson et al. (2004), we have surprisingly little empirical evidence regarding the process 
through which discount rates are formed, especially in countries with less developed 
economic institutions. In this paper we study the sample of Ugandan villagers. Most 
importantly, the study provides empirical evidence on the causal impact of education on the 
subjective discount rate. 
There are good reasons as to why education may lower discount rate. In their model 
of the endogenous discount rate, Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that education can be 
understood as an investment in patience. Education can help one to form a mental picture of 
one’s future pleasures and difficulties in life and enhances the process of anticipation. In 
  - 3 -addition, through repeated practice at problem-solving, education helps one to learn the art of 
scenario simulation. In this way, education can be understood as a tool that helps people to 
perceive future pleasures as less remote. As Böhm-Bawerk (1891, p.244) writes: “The 
present always gets its rights. It forces itself upon us through our senses. To cry for food 
when hungry occurs even to a baby. But future we must anticipate and picture…We must be 
able to form a mental picture of what will be the state of our wants, needs, feelings, at any 
particular point of time.” 
Psychological studies demonstrate that humans are born impatient (Mischel, Shoda 
and Rodriguez 1989; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). Learning to be future-oriented and to 
choose actions with a postponed reward is an essential part of our upbringing and educational 
process. Without such learning, people would live solely within the present without much 
will to resist current temptations and would simply omit future pleasures from their decision-
making process (Doepke and Zilibotti 2006; Shonkoff and Phillips 2000).  
Studies that extend their samples beyond the usual pool of university students often 
find a correlation between education level and discount rate. In the major study that elicits 
discount rate in a developed country Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002) showed on a 
representative sample of Danish households that highly educated adults have subjective 
discount rates as low as two thirds of those less educated.
 1 In less developed countries, the 
difference is likely to be even more profound, as there may be additional pathways through 
which education can increase patience. Kirby et al. (2002) studied discount rate in two remote 
villages in the Bolivian rain forest. They found high average discount rate and that a large 
                                                           
1 Another important study from a developed country is Dohmen et al (2007) who find negative correlation 
between cognitive ability and discount rate in Germany. Their result is broadly consistent with hypothesized 
effect education, because education is likely to improve cognitive ability. For a comprehensive survey of studies 
that elicit subjective discount rate in developed countries see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002). 
Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) survey studies from lower-income countries. 
  - 4 -proportion of its variance can be explained by years of schooling, parental education and 
measures of qualitative education achievements in terms of mathematics and language 
proficiency. Similar results were obtained in rural areas in India by Bauer and Chytilová 
(2008). In their study of subjective discount rates in Vietnam, Anderson et al. (2004) 
emphasize the importance of education although they do not specifically measure it. Pender 
(1996) and Tanaka et al. (2006) find a relationship between patience and income in India and 
Vietnam, respectively. 
This paper should complement the earlier evidence in two ways. First, to our 
knowledge, the direction of causality between education and discount rate has not been 
addressed by any of the previous studies that have elicited discount rates. To estimate the 
impact of education on the discount rate, we use information on varying school frequency in 
different villages and the number of school-age years that overlap with the era of Idi Amin as 
reasonably exogenous sources of variation in education. Second, our sample was drawn from 
members of a rural society less influenced by modern market structures (e.g., credit markets) 
than undergraduates from affluent societies who are the usual subjects in this type of study. 
The environment is also very different compared to a few earlier studies from less developed 
countries. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we describe the survey design and discuss 
issues related to measuring discount rate. In Section 3 we show the relationship between the 
discount rate and individual characteristics and demonstrate the causal effect of education on 
discount rate. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2 Survey Design 
2.1 Measuring time discounting 
  - 5 -Numerous methods have been used to measure individual discounting (Frederick et al. 
2002). Before analyzing our results, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this type 
of study. 
We used choice task method to elicit discount rate (Frederick et al. 2002). Individuals 
were asked to express their preference between receiving a smaller reward immediately and 
receiving a larger reward with some delay. Starting with the question, “Would you prefer to 
receive USh 200,000 today or USh 250,000 in one year?
2” we posed five questions, each time 
increasing the amount offered in the future. As we increased the future amount, we expected 
more individuals to select the future option. The point at which a respondent switches from 
the current amount to the future amount provides the range for his/her discount rate and the 
midpoint of the range is our best estimate of the person’s discount rate. The amount in 
question was set relatively high so as to be relevant for important savings or investment 
choices. In particular, we had in mind the situation of many farmers in southern Uganda who 
were growing vanilla in 2004 and due to the boom in the international vanilla market had 
substantially higher income than they expected.
3
Proper understanding of the time-discounting questions is particularly important in an 
environment with low average education levels. Two rounds of pre-testing with ten 
respondents were done to limit systematic misunderstanding, and the questionnaires were 
adjusted based on follow-up discussions.
4 The respondents’ ability to understand the 
                                                           
2 In November 2005, the exchange rate was 1,830 USh to USD. 
3 As of 2005 Uganda numbered among the ten largest producers of vanilla, with Madagascar producing almost 
60% of the overall world vanilla production. At the end of 1990s price of vanilla was around USD 40 per kg. 
The typhoon and political instability in Madagascar drove vanilla prices to USD 500 per kg at the beginning of 
2004 (Uganda Export Promotion Board 2006). 
4  The major decision resulting from the pretest was not to use the matching-task method for eliciting discount 
rate (used in e.g. Anderson et al. 2004), when respondents are asked to stipulate a monetary amount that equates 
  - 6 -discount-rate questions based on binary choices was later checked by observing how many 
respondents from the whole sample switched back to the current income option after 
preferring future income in the previous binary choice. In the sample, less than 3% of 
respondents gave inconsistent answers. In addition, we test whether less-educated individuals 
are more likely to answer inconsistently and find that inconsistent responses are uncorrelated 
with education, and also with any other observed characteristics. As mentioned earlier, the 
inconsistent responses were not included into the analysis. 
An important design choice is whether to use real or hypothetical rewards. In studies 
involving hypothetical rewards, respondents can be presented with a wider range of reward 
options, including relatively large gains, which are generally infeasible in studies involving 
real outcomes. As mentioned above, our aim was to approximate a financial decision of 
similar magnitude as unexpected income gains during the period of high vanilla prices in 
2004. On the other hand, with hypothetical rewards there is a legitimate concern that 
respondents will have little incentive to work hard or thoughtfully on their responses 
(Harrison et al. 2005), in which case, our measure would yield a noisy estimate of 
discounting. Several experimenters have directly compared discount rates based on real and 
hypothetical rewards. While Kirby and Marakovic (1996) and Coller and Williams (1999) 
found lower discount rates for hypothetical choices than for real choices, Johnson and Bickel 
(2002), Madden et al. (2003) and Hamoudi and Thomas (2006) did not observe this 
difference in their experiments. There has also been considerable debate outside of the 
context of inter-temporal choice on this issue. The general conclusion from this debate is that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
two intertemporal options. We found that the respondents participating in the pretest had difficulties 
understanding this task properly. Therefore, we opted for choice-task method, which is simpler although it 
generates less precise estimates of discount rate. On more detailed comparison of relative advantages between 
these two methods see Frederick et al. (2002). 
  - 7 -the two methods typically yield qualitatively similar results, although financial incentives 
often decrease the variance of responses (Camerer and Hogarth 1999).  
In traditional communities the person or institution that organizes an experiment is a 
particularly important parameter in terms of how local people approach the assigned tasks. 
The high social status of, and respect for, our instructors (social workers) within the village 
community should help to mitigate the possible problem of missing monetary incentives.
5
A related question in terms of the validity of elicited discount rate is its relevance to 
economic decisions. For example, Binswanger (1980) experimentally measured aversion to 
risk in rural India and found that individuals with a higher degree of risk aversion choose 
more conservative agricultural strategies. In our sample we found that more patient 
respondents are more likely to use a mosquito net and assign higher importance to child 
schooling in their fertility decisions. The correlation with the discount rate is -0.089 (p-value 
= 0.010) and -0.086 (p-value = 0.012), respectively.  
There are a few reliability issues related specifically to the choice task method for 
eliciting discount rate. Binary choices do not reveal a single indifference point that would 
allow a single discount rate to be inferred. Instead, they provide a range of inferred discount 
rate. The amounts offered in the questions may themselves communicate to respondents how 
much they should be discounting, resulting in a framing effect. The total range between the 
lowest and highest discount rate may not be sufficient to cover the preferences of some of the 
respondents. Although we increased the range upwards after pre-testing, the upper bound was 
still not high enough for many respondents, who chose the current option even in the last pair 
                                                           
5 According to the feedback from the instructors the survey questions were a favourite topic for local people to 
discuss during their free time in the evenings after the survey. This deliberate expression of interest also 
suggests that the survey was a special event in the lives of local people and that respondents were serious in 
their responses.  
  - 8 -in which the future option was highest. In the statistical analysis we employed 650% as a 
censoring value for these responses.  
Lastly, researchers have found that the discount rate is not a constant and it may differ 
due to the effect of delay, size and sign of the amount in question (Frederick et al. 2002). The 
smaller the amount, the higher the discount rate is. Discount rates for losses seem to be 
smaller than discount rates for gains. Discount rates seem to be higher for short delays – e.g. 
three days – than for long delays – e.g. one year. Respondents in our study were deciding 
about a relatively high gain with alternative amount to be given one year later. 
These caveats are particularly relevant for comparison of the absolute values of 
discount rates across different studies. For the purposes of this study, it is important to note 
that we are primarily interested in differences of discount rate across socioeconomic 
characteristics within our sample and not in particular absolute values. The respondents are 
facing the same protocol and it is plausible to assume that any biases in terms of effort and 
understanding are not systematic across different groups. In other words, we assume they do 
not depend on the examined explanatory variable and we therefore believe that the 
significance of observed relationships should be unaffected by the issues discussed above. 
 
2.2 Sample  
This study is based on data from a questionnaire survey that was conducted in ten 
village areas in the Mukono district, which is located in the southern part of Uganda. The 
district is primarily rural with an economy based on small-scale subsistence farming and local 
market trade. People usually grow maize, vegetables, plantain bananas, cassava, vanilla and 
coffee. The vast majority of households in this region are very poor by any standards, with an 
average per capita income of less than USD 300 a year and life expectancy at birth reaching 
only 46 years, largely due to the effects of malaria and HIV/AIDS (World Development 
  - 9 -Indicators 2005). 85% of Ugandan inhabitants live in rural areas with similar characteristics 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) 2002). Uganda is a low-inflation country and its 
inflation levels do not differ significantly from those in developed economies.
6
Data were collected in November 2005 in cooperation with UCDT, a Czech-Ugandan 
NGO in the ten village areas. Because there are no lists of area residents available to allow us 
to employ the random selection method, we used a combination of the random walk method 
and quota sampling in our sampling procedure. We stipulated four groups in terms of age and 
education so that the proportion of participants within each of these groups corresponded to 
the overall rural statistics (UBOS 2002). The target population was restricted to literate 
individuals above 15 years. Only a few selected individuals did not agree to participate. 
A total of 910 respondents participated. The respondents were not time-constrained 
when filling out the questionnaires. Most of them did not have previous experience with 
filling out such questionnaires and they approached the task very responsibly. On average 
they spent one and a half hours answering the questions. In all, 54 questionnaires were not 
filled out completely
7.  The incomplete questionnaires are excluded from the analysis and our 
sample size reduced from 910 to 856 respondents. 
We collected information on individual characteristics, specifically regarding age, 
education level, marital status, clan linkage and profession. Table 1 shows the summary 
statistics of the sample. The level of education was measured by the number of school classes 
completed by the respondent. The average educational attainment in our sample is higher 
than that of Uganda as a whole, where only 38% of children complete primary school (UBOS 
2002), as compared to 70% in our sample. The questionnaires were bilingual – in English and 
                                                           
6 The average inflation rate for the period 2000–2004 was 4.3 percent (World Development Indicators 2005).  
7 28 respondents either did not answer consistently the question on discount rate or they did not answer this 
question at all. Another 26 answered the question on discount rate but did not give information on one of the 
individual characteristics (usually age, as not knowing one’s precise date of birth is quite common in the area). 
  - 10 -Luganda – to allow us to approach less educated people who speak only Luganda
8. Illiterate 
individuals could not participate. The Ugandan illiteracy rate among people aged over 15 
years is 31% (World Development Indicators 2005). Illiteracy explains why our respondents 
are more educated and younger than the Ugandan averages.  
Income is approximated by individual profession since, as we found during a pretest, 
respondents were generally uncomfortable with revealing their income. The sample is divided 
into four groups: self-employed farmers, self-employed non-farmers (shopkeepers and 
drivers), employees (mostly teachers and employees of NGOs) and others (students and those 
who did not fit any of the previous categories). Strength of clan is a binary variable that 
indicates self-reported embeddedness within family structures and is based on a survey 
question about clan influence on fertility decision-making.  
The respondents were also asked about mosquito net usage and self-reported 
importance of child schooling. The purpose of these two variables is to cross-check the 
relevance of the elicited hypothetical discount rate to actual behavior in delayed-reward 
situations. 
The respondents indicated their village of residence. This information, jointly with 
age, allows us to approximate access to educational facilities during the individual’s school 
years. We match this information with data from UBOS and the Ugandan Ministry of 
Education to calculate the number of primary and secondary schools per thousand inhabitants 
in the given village area for different cohorts.  
 
3 Correlates of discount rate 
                                                           
8 The official language in Uganda is English. The different local languages reflect the tribal divisions within 
Uganda. Luganda is the language of the Baganda people – the largest tribe in Uganda. 
  - 11 -Although the discount rate is perhaps biologically determined to some degree, it is 
reasonable to regard it as not immutable. We will now explore how individual characteristics 
are able to predict the discount rate. In Table 2 we compare the mean discount rate for 
different sub-groups without controlling for other observable characteristics.  
First, we find that more educated individuals have a lower discount rate. For example, 
men and women who studied at a secondary school have a significantly lower discount rate 
than those who did not. As described earlier, this correlation has been found in various 
studies in different contexts. The result is consistent with the proposition that education 
makes individuals more patient by enhancing their ability to plan and/or by increasing their 
permanent income (Becker and Mulligan 1997). Alternatively, more patient individuals might 
be more willing to delay gratification and invest in their human capital or there could be an 
omitted variable, such as intelligence, which would account for both the discount rate and the 
differences in education level.  In section 4 we will address the issue of causation in detail 
and examine the impact of education on discount rate. 
We find that self-employed farmers and non-farm workers (drivers, shopkeepers) are 
on average more impatient than employed individuals (teachers, employees of public bodies 
or NGOs) and students (a large part of the group marked as “other” in Table 2), although 
employed women have similar level of impatience as farmers. Although individual profession 
is likely to be an imprecise proxy of income, these results are broadly consistent with the 
hypothesis that individuals facing less income pressures discount less.  
Note that similar concerns about causation discussed with regard to education are 
relevant to income as well. Becker and Mulligan (1997), for example, argue that wealth (and 
possibly income) should decrease discount rate because richer people can afford to delay 
consumption and invest more. Alternatively, a low income may be a result of a high discount 
rate and the selection of occupation with flat income profile that does not require learning and 
  - 12 -training (Lawrence 1991, Doepke and Zilibotti 2005). Pender (1996) and Tanaka et al. (2006) 
found a negative relation between income and the discount rate in India and Vietnam, 
respectively. Kirby et al. (2002) observed correlation with wealth, but not with income. 
Anderson et al. (2004) do not find correlation between these two variables, but they point out 
that failure to identify it may be due to the difficulty of measuring income among the poor in 
the field. 
Older individuals in our sample discount future income more heavily than their 
younger counterparts. This relationship accords with the traditional economic argument based 
on the permanent income hypothesis, in which people are assumed to reflect their current life 
expectancy in their inter-temporal decisions. The shorter the expected time to death, the 
higher the discount rate. On average we do indeed observe this pattern; age appears to be a 
significant predictor of discount rate and has a positive slope. 
Numerous studies from low-income countries have reported that a higher share of 
income in the hands of women leads to less household expenditure on current consumption 
(e.g., Thomas 1990). There is new experimental evidence from Mexico and India showing 
that women have a lower discount rate than men (Hamoudi and Thomas 2006, Bauer and 
Chytilová 2008). As in Kirby et al. (2002 ) and Anderson et al. (2004), we have found no 
evidence for this pattern. 
Social arrangements within a family or groups of families (clans) may also affect 
discount rate. Based on his observations of village institutions in Africa, Platteau (2000) 
argues that reciprocal claims to financial assistance among clan members may encourage 
individuals to spend money faster and lower their incentives to save. A similar argument is 
made in the context of intra-household relations, in which women facing spousal pressure are 
less likely to save (Anderson and Baland 2002). We have not found any significant difference 
in the discount rate between married and single respondents. Respondents who report strong 
  - 13 -clan linkage have a higher discount rate, in accordance with the findings of Platteau (2000). 
As shown below, this correlation has a rather low level of significance after controlling for 
other variables, education in particular. 
We have identified a close association between education and discount rate. In the 
bivariate analysis in Table 2 we allowed educated individuals to “carry with them” other 
characteristics which they typically have, such as income or age, and which may also affect 
discount rate. To probe this relationship further, in Table 3 we run a series of OLS 
regressions. The dependent variable is the discount rate. Observations are clustered at the 
village level if not explicitly specified otherwise. 
In Table 3, columns 1-3 we control only for cohort and life-cycle effects by including 
a set of twelve dummies into the regression, one dummy for each 5-year cohort starting from 
1941-45. We find that more educated individuals have a lower discount rate at 1% level. 
Adding controls for individual profession and family ties leaves the education coefficient and 
standard errors almost intact (columns 4-6). In columns 7-9 we also control for potential 
direct effects of village-area characteristics and include a set of village dummies into the 
regression, instead of clustering. The main result holds, although the coefficient for men is 
slightly lower. 
Potentially, the results could be affected by our decision to calculate the discount rate 
values as the arithmetic means of the six inferred ranges. As a robustness check, we have 
repeated the same analysis as in Table 3 and applied an ordered probit regression instead of 
OLS. The results are qualitatively similar: a higher level of education predicts a lower 
discount rate (Appendix, Table A1).  
This correlation does not help us determine the direction of the causal relationship 
between these two factors. To our knowledge, as yet there has been no empirical study of 
discount rate that has tested causal direction in the observed correlation between education 
  - 14 -and discount rate. The next section estimates the impact of education on discount rate using 
the instrumental variable technique. 
 
4 The impact of education on discount rate 
 
A solution to the problem of causal inference requires an exogenous source of 
variation in education (Card 1999). Long distances to school and a lack of school capacities 
are widely regarded as major obstacles to higher school attendance in low-income countries, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2002). For example, Duflo (2001) and Duflo 
and Breierova (2004) have convincingly demonstrated a simultaneous change in education 
and other variables of interest (e.g., income, fertility or child mortality) resulting from a large 
scale school construction program in Indonesia.   
In this paper we use two different sources of variation in education: different access to 
schools in different villages and the effect of instability during the Idi Amin era on respective 
school-age cohorts. Hence, the first instrument exploits primarily the variation by region and 
the second instrument is based on variation over time. We show that both types of 
instruments deliver very similar estimates of the effect of education on discount rate for men. 
 
4.1 Identification strategy 
Number of primary and secondary schools 
Our first type of instrumental variable is based on the observation that individuals 
belonging to village areas with better access to schools are more educated. We match our 
individual survey data with village-area-level data collected by the Ugandan Ministry of 
Education and Sports and UBOS. We then construct two variables to approximate access to 
  - 15 -schools: the number of primary schools and the number of secondary schools in a village area 
per one thousand inhabitants.  
These instrumental variables are constructed as follows. We start with the information 
about the number of primary and secondary schools for each village area and the date on 
which they were established.
9 We calculate the average number of schools for each five-year 
period, starting with 1941-1945 and ending with 2001-2005. Due to the rapid population 
growth in Uganda during 1941-2005 and potential difference in the size of village areas,
10 it 
is more accurate to measure school access in terms of the number of schools per capita rather 
then the total number of schools. The number of schools is divided by the population size of 
the village area. Cohort specific population size of the village area is obtained by adjusting 
the number of inhabitants in 2002 (UBOS) for average population growth in Uganda (World 
Development Indicators 2006).
11 Finally, each respondent is assigned the number of primary 
schools in the village area when she was at the age to start primary school (7 years) and the 
availability of secondary schools when she was at the age to start secondary school (15 
years). 
Table 4 shows the average number of schools per thousand people during the period 
1941-2005. We can observe substantial variation in secondary school access across village 
                                                           
9 Ideally, one would like to have panel data measuring the number of schools in village areas over time. 
According to our inquiries with the Ugandan Ministry of Education, these data do not exist, which is not 
surprising given the periods of instability in Ugandan history. As a consequence, there may be a measurement 
error in our constructs of school availability due to missing information about schools that were abolished 
before 2005. 
10 According to the detailed maps which we have received from UBOS, the village areas we study are not very 
different from each other in terms of geographical size.  
11 Historical statistics about population size in each village area are not available, with the exception of the year 
2002. We need to assume that the population growth was the same in all village areas. 
  - 16 -areas, but less so for primary schools. There is only a relatively small differential variation 
over time across villages. This prevents us from including village fixed effects to the 
regression analysis as these would capture the effect of varying school availability as we 
discuss below.  
Table 5 illustrates the simple logic of our identification strategy. This table shows the 
means of education and the discount rate for individuals with above- and below-median 
access to primary and secondary education facilities (the middle and left sections of the 
panel, respectively). Although the results are imprecise due to the fact that only a small part 
of the information is used, we can observe simultaneous change in education and discount 
rate. Men who live in villages with better access to secondary schools have both higher 
education and a lower discount rate. The pattern holds with greater uncertainty also for 
primary schools. 
Note that this identification strategy is less suitable for women than it is for men. In 
southern Uganda, it is common practice for a wife to move to her husband’s village following 
their wedding (Kaduuli 2006). The instrumental variables are based on access to schools in 
the village area in which the respondents lived at the time of the survey, not where they lived 
during their schooling age. The marriage-induced migration is likely to introduce a 
substantial measurement error into our estimates of the effects of schools on education for 
women, unless there is a strong matching of couples based on achieved education level. In 
further analysis we will compute the estimates for men and women separately. Indeed, the 
(non-)results for women showed below are consistent with the notion of substantial 
migration.  
A major threat to this identification strategy is the possibility that there are village-
level unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the number of schools and directly 
affect discount rate (e.g., demand for education, access to health care). Ideally, we would like 
  - 17 -to include village fixed effects into our regressions to address this issue. However, our 
instruments are largely based on the variation in schools across villages. To examine further,  
we use variable that is based on variation over time as the second type of instrument and 
show that the results are robust to village fixed effects (similarly as the OLS estimates in 
Table 3). 
 
Disorder during the era of Idi Amin 
Parents are typically less motivated to send their children to school during periods of 
disorder. Our second type of instrument exploits the variation in education associated with 
the period during which the dictator Idi Amin was in power in Uganda (1971-1979). During 
that time, the country suffered enormous economic decline and it was inevitable that the 
education system would deteriorate as well (Furley 1988). Government expenditures per head 
fell to less than a quarter of pre-Amin levels and education expenditures further diminished as 
an increasing share of resources was diverted for military purposes (Stewart et al. 1997, 
Collier and Reinikka 2001). Amin, himself illiterate, and his regime is known for being 
highly suspicious of the loyalty of educated people, many of whom where targeted by the 
army or exiled (Furley 1988). When Amin declared an “economic war” in 1972 and expelled 
the Asian community out of the country, an exodus of European expatriate teachers followed, 
leaving enormous gaps in the teaching staff. The breakdown of contract enforcement 
mechanisms led to a high incidence of teachers’ absenteeism (Collier and Reinikka 2001). 
The quality of education declined sharply as a result.
12 Appleton et al. (1996) use UNESCO 
estimates and report decreases in primary school enrollment between 1965 and 1975. 
                                                           
12 There is only anecdotal evidence of the impacts on education infrastructure. Heyneman (1983) reports the 
effects on six schools in south Uganda (Mpigi district – close to Mukono district). In 1971 there was on average 
  - 18 -To approximate the extent to which individual education is affected by this period of 
instability, we simply calculate the number of years of the respondent’s primary schooling 
age (7-14 years of age) that overlap with the period 1971-1979. The value of our instrument 
is the highest (8) for people born in 1964 or in 1965 who passed their entire primary 
schooling age during Amin’s era. The value of the instrument decreases by one with each 
year that the individual birth year departs from 1964-1965 in either direction. It reaches zero  
for those born before 1957 or after 1972.  
Since the instrument is based on the variation over time and our data are cross-
sectional, we discuss how our estimates may be affected by direct effects of age on discount 
rate, independently of education. In the OLS regression we have simply included a dummy 
for each five-year cohort to control for these effects.  In 2SLS regression the effect of 
instability could be captured partially by the instrument and partially by the five-year cohort 
dummies.  For this reason, we create only one dummy variable for all cohorts inside and next 
to the period of Amin and we keep controlling for the same five-year cohort dummies for all 
other cohorts.  As a consequence, our instrument is the only variable which varies over time 
for the cohorts born between 1957-1972.  Note that by its construction, our instrument can 
capture only u-shaped relationship with respect to time. Therefore, our estimates would be 
biased by direct effect of age on discount rate only in a situation, when there would be an 
inverted u-shaped relationship between age and discount rate, independently of education, for 
cohorts whose education is likely to be affected by Amin’s era. We believe this is unlikely. 
A potential threat to this identification strategy is that the exposure to political 
instability during primary-schooling age might have potentially affected time discounting via 
a channel other than schooling that persists over time (e.g., psychological trauma, negative 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
one chair for every 1.2 pupils; in 1981 there was one chair for every 8.8 pupils. Four out of the six schools did 
not have a single textbook in 1981, whereas these four schools had on average 84 textbooks in 1971. 
  - 19 -effect on health due to undernourishment during youth). Note that this type of threat is 
orthogonal to the concerns discussed with respect to the set of instruments based on variation 
in access to schools.  
 
We expect that the higher the exposure to Amin’s era, the lower the education level. 
In Figure 1 we show that before Amin the education of men had increasing trend, but the 
education of cohorts that were of primary-school age during Amin’s era departs from this 
trend. Overall, as the exposure of respondents’ schooling age to the Amin’s era increases, 
their level of education decreases.  Those who were born in 1964-65 and therefore passed 
their entire primary school years during Amin’s era seem to be the most affected.  
For women, the education level did not decrease during the era of Amin’s rule, which 
suggests that the years of exposure is not a valid instrument for them. Finding reasons for this 
differential pattern is rather a speculative exercise; most likely it is due to the fact that 
cultural barriers against educating women have been gradually diminishing or that boys more 
than girls are needed for other activities than schooling during the periods of disorder. Similar 
pattern is found by other studies as well. Chesterfield et al. (2001) study the negative effect of 
crises on education in six countries for which the data are available (Burundi, DR Congo, 
Mozambique, Sudan, Nicaragua and Turkey). They find greater negative change in school 
enrollment for boys than for girls in all the African countries. Akresh and de Walque (2008) 
find the same pattern in the context of Rwandan genocide. 
 
4.2 Results 
Table 6 presents the main set of results for the first set of instrumental variables based 
on variation in access to secondary and primary schools. The lower panel shows the results of 
the first stage regression, where the dependent variable is years of schooling. The upper panel 
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excluded instrumental variable is the number of secondary schools. We start with controlling 
for cohort effects only. For men, we observe that living in villages with a higher number of 
secondary schools leads to a higher individual level of education; this relationship is 
significant at 1% level. The underidentification and weak identification tests do not reject the 
relevance of the instrument, either. Further, the 2SLS estimates demonstrate a significant 
negative effect of education on discount rate. The estimated effect using 2SLS is above the 
corresponding OLS estimate (Table 3, column 2). For women, we observe a negative 
coefficient of education, though not statistically significant. 
 The evidence for the causal effect of education on men’s discount rate is robust to 
alternative specifications. In columns 3-4 of Table 6 we add (potentially endogenous) 
variables that may also affect discount rate, such as income related to a particular profession, 
marital status and individual ties to the clan. The corresponding 2SLS estimate of the effect 
of education is larger than the one estimated without these controls, although it is not 
distinguishable statistically. In columns 5-8, primary schools -- instead of secondary schools -
- are used as the excluded instrument for education.  For men, we find similar results as those 
with secondary schools, but with greater uncertainty. For women, we observe that primary 
schools have no explanatory power for their education, which is not surprising given the 
above-mentioned marriage migration. Using both primary and secondary schools as 
instruments (columns 9-12) delivers very similar estimates of the effect of education as those 
found in columns 1 and 3, both in terms of the size of the effect and its significance level. 
Table 7 shows the main results when the exposure to Amin’s era is used as the 
excluded instrumental variable. In columns 1-4 we cluster the standard errors at the village 
level. Exposure to Amin’s era lowers the education of men, whereas it does not affect 
women’s education. In the second stage, we find that a higher level of education reduces 
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variable allows to control directly for village fixed effects (columns 5-8). The results do not 
change substantively. Interestingly, the magnitude of all these estimates is very similar to the 
magnitude of those we obtained when using the measures of school access as instruments 
(Table 6). 
In Table 8 we combine both types of instrumental variables. In the first stage both 
types of instruments strongly predict the level of education in the expected directions for 
men. In the second stage education reduces men’s discount rate. The magnitude of the effect 
is similar to previous estimates reported in Tables 6 and 7, the precision is however higher 
(the results are significant at 1% level).   
For women, the estimates go in the same direction as for men both in the first and 
second stage, but they are much less statistically significant. In general, our analysis for 
women is inconclusive. On one hand the correlation between education and the discount rate 
in the OLS regressions is significant at 1% level and of similar magnitude as for men. 
However, we do not have any suitable instrument to assess the issue of causality for women. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The paper aims to contribute to the rich literature that studies the causes of the low 
levels of saving and investment in rural parts of low-income countries. The paper focuses on 
the formation of time discounting as a possible explanation of this important issue and it 
demonstrates a causal effect of education on subjective discount rate in ten village areas in 
southern Uganda. 
First, we study various socioeconomic characteristics that were suggested in earlier 
literature as possible determinants of time preference. The discount rate emerged significantly 
correlated with completed years of schooling: more educated respondents are more patient. 
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are more likely to make choices with delayed rewards, such as using a mosquito net or 
assigning higher importance to schooling of their offspring. 
To our knowledge, comparable studies that elicit discount rate have not attempted to 
depart from the observed correlation between education and discount rate by testing the 
impact of education on discount rate. In order to do so, we exploit two independent 
exogenous sources of variation in schooling: across villages and over time. The first set of 
instrumental variables is based on differential access to primary and secondary schools in 
different villages. The second type is based on the number of individual school-age years that 
overlap with the rule of Idi Amin (1971-79) -- a period of overall instability characterized by 
a drastic decline in quality of education. For men, both instrumental variables strongly predict 
individual education in the expected direction. The 2SLS estimates demonstrate a significant 
negative effect of education on men’s discount rate. Both types of instrumental variables 
deliver estimates of similar magnitude. The results are robust to the inclusion of a set of 
dummies for cohort effects, individual characteristics such as profession, family status, and, 
in the case of the latter instrument, for village fixed effects.   
This evidence is consistent with several specific channels through which education 
may affect discounting. First, schooling may promote the creation of cognitive skills and the 
ability to simulate and plan for the future (McClure et al. 2004, Becker and Mulligan 1997). 
Second, education may play an important role in developing control mechanisms to manage 
the temptations of present consumption. This understanding resonates with the increasingly 
loud calls among development economists for the exploration of not only the structural 
constraints that poverty imposes on the decision-making of the poor but for taking seriously 
also the internal barriers to saving and investing in the absence of suitable institutions (Duflo 
2006, Armedáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005). A recent study from rural India (Bauer et al. 
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present-biased (or hyperbolic) discounting. Third, education may enhance health prevention 
and reduce mortality risk, which might make individuals more willing to delay their 
spending. Another explanation is that more educated individuals are less likely to be income 
constrained and face lower pressures to spend money sooner. Although the results are robust 
to controlling for individual profession, it might be an imperfect proxy for income and 
education may capture the effect of income instead. 
The capacity of education to reduce time discounting further emphasizes its prominent 
position in debates about economic development. It has been widely observed in cross-
country analyses that standard estimates of the contribution of additional schooling to 
economic growth, based on productivity differences associated with differences in the level 
of schooling, cover only a relatively small portion of the total correlation between education 
and subsequent growth (Bils and Klenow 2000, Banerjee and Duflo 2004). Similarly, World 
Bank (2006) acknowledges that “education impact on economic growth is well-established; 
precisely how this happens is less well-understood.” In addition to the role of education as a 
factor in the aggregate production function, there might be other effects of education that 
contribute to economic growth, such as its impact on fertility or health (Case 2006). The 
evidence from Ugandan villages may start teasing researchers and policy-makers with the 
proposition that there might be a new channel through which education promotes 
development – by shaping individual time discounting. 
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Table 1 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (MEANS) 
   Total     Sex    Age group 
         Male  Female    15-19  20-29  30-74 
Frequency:                         
   N  856    465  391    324  291  241 
   Sample  1.000    0.543  0.457    0.379  0.340  0.282 
   Rural Uganda
+ 1.000    0.475  0.525    0.222  0.314  0.464 
Education:                         
   Completed PS - sample  0.701    0.740  0.655    0.799  0.742  0.519 
   Completed PS - rural Uganda
+ 0.382    0.426  0.336    0.440  0.459  0.301 
   Completed SS - sample  0.074    0.086  0.059    0.000  0.134  0.100 
   Completed SS - rural Uganda
+ 0.064    0.080  0.048    0.015  0.097  0.065 
Age:                        
   Sample  25.811    26.112  25.453    16.935  24.017  39.909 
   Rural Uganda
+ 31.921    31.884  31.955    16.897  24.116  44.411 
Family:                        
   Married  0.431    0.411  0.455    0.068  0.436  0.913 
   Strong clan linkage  0.188    0.252  0.113    0.179  0.141  0.257 
Profession:                       
   Farmer  0.409    0.359  0.468    0.148  0.447  0.714 
   Non-farm self-employed  0.057    0.075  0.036    0.009  0.065  0.112 
   Employed  0.131    0.140  0.120    0.006  0.241  0.166 
   Other  0.403    0.426  0.376    0.836  0.247  0.008 
NOTE.- 
+ Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2002), data for population of rural Uganda in the age group 15-74. 
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Table 2 
AVERAGE DISCOUNT RATE (MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
   All  Male  Female 
Education:          
   Lower PS (1-4 classes)  4.598  3.643  5.303 
   (2.715)  (3.039)  (2.280) 
   Higher PS (5-7 classes)  4.519  4.551  4.489 
   (2.634)  (2.682)  (2.601) 
   Lower SS (8-9 classes)  3.911  4.106  3.625 
   (2.914)  (2.837)  (3.020) 
   Higher SS (10-13 classes)  3.447  3.398  3.508 
   (2.907)  (2.870)  (2.960) 
   Completed SS and higher education  3.218  2.850  3.859 
   (2.787)  (2.828)  (2.652) 
Age:          
   Young (<19)  3.368  3.679  3.016 
   (2.915)  (2.902)  (2.899) 
   Middle-aged (20-29)  3.989  3.701  4.312 
   (2.805)  (2.810)  (2.773) 
   Old (>29)  4.339  4.020  4.775 
   (2.757)  (2.876)  (2.536) 
Clan linkage:          
   Weak  3.718  3.614  3.823 
   (2.899)  (2.899)  (2.900) 
   Strong  4.433  4.308  4.767 
   (2.607)  (2.694)  (2.357) 
Proffesion:          
   Farmer  4.358  4.219  4.485 
   (2.719)  (2.794)  (2.650) 
   Non-farm self-employed  4.020  3.907  4.304 
   (2.655)  (2.651)  (2.742) 
   Employed  3.897  3.419  4.559 
   (2.875)  (2.964)  (2.637) 
   Other  3.301  3.525  3.000 
   (2.932)  (2.894)  (2.966) 
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Table 3 
CORRELATES OF DISCOUNT RATE: OLS 
Dependent variable  Discount rate (%) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
   all  male  female    all  male  female    all  male  female 
                                 
Education (years)  -0.171  -0.160  -0.172    -0.170  -0.168  -0.171    -0.156  -0.115  -0.182 
   (0.045)***  (0.061)**  (0.032)***    (0.048)***  (0.066)**  (0.035)***    (0.045)***  (0.065)*  (0.067)*** 
Farmer             0.259  -0.318  0.705    0.433  -0.074  0.770 
              (0.373)  (0.596)  (0.260)**    (0.349)  (0.493)  (0.530) 
Non-farm self-employed             -0.051  -0.540  0.345    -0.126  -0.585  0.276 
              (0.545)  (0.738)  (0.763)    (0.518)  (0.644)  (0.949) 
Employed             0.507  -0.203  1.276    0.494  -0.306  1.300 
              (0.389)  (0.460)  (0.539)**    (0.414)  (0.581)  (0.622)** 
Married             -0.217  -0.090  -0.451    -0.253  -0.241  -0.391 
              (0.244)  (0.309)  (0.334)    (0.296)  (0.449)  (0.416) 
Clan linkage             0.470  0.465  0.580    0.364  0.409  0.526 
              (0.275)  (0.351)  (0.465)    (0.254)  (0.322)  (0.468) 
Constant  5.451  2.459  8.397    5.405  2.913  8.129    4.659  2.483  7.571 
   (2.051)**  (0.368)***  (0.352)***    (2.107)**  (0.911)**  (0.426)***    (2.089)**  (2.968)  (3.030)** 
Cohort effects  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes 
Village fixed effects  no  no  no    no  no  no    yes  yes  yes 
Observations  856  465  391    856  465  391    856  465  391 
R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.10    0.06  0.06  0.11    0.10  0.12  0.13 
NOTE. -  The dependent variable is the discount rate calculated from the binary choices between amount now and after one year. In columns 1-6 standard errors are corrected 
for clustering at the village level. In columns 7-9 we control for village fixed effects. In all columns we control for cohort effects by including a dummy variable for each 5-
year cohort (it equals to one if an individual was 7 years old in that particular period) starting from 1941-45.  
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%.
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Table 4 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF SCHOOLS PER THOUSAND PEOPLE IN THE PERIOD 1941-
2005 (MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
   Primary Schools  Secondary Schools
Buikwe  0.814  0.017 
   (0.274)  (0.041) 
Busagazi  0.675  0.013 
   (0.451)  (0.047) 
Bweyogerere  0.938  0.102 
   (0.329)  (0.197) 
Kasolo  0.675  0.067 
   (0.255)  (0.101) 
Kateete  0.898  0.016 
   (0.293)  (0.030) 
Kigaya  0.592  0.030 
   (0.296)  (0.073) 
Kikube  0.694  0.005 
   (0.211)  (0.018) 
Kirugu  0.529  0.031 
   (0.383)  (0.061) 
Nakifuma  0.978  0.012 
   (0.370)  (0.030) 
Lugasa  1.107  0.144 
   (0.365)  (0.131) Table 5 
EDUCATION AND DISCOUNT RATE ACROSS SECONDARY SCHOOLS, PRIMARY SCHOOLS AND LIVING DURING CONFLICT 
ERA (MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
   SS accessibility    PS accessibility    At PS age during conflict 
   lower  higher  difference    lower   higher  difference    yes  no  difference 
All                                
Education  8.998  10.031  1.033**    9.421  9.599  0.178    8.717  9.645  0.928** 
   (3.093)  (2.652)       (2.746)  (3.112)       (3.127)  (2.873)    
Discount rate  4.153  3.543  -0.610**    3.732  3.981  0.249    4.520  3.736  -0.784** 
   (2.813)  (2.876)       (2.835)  (2.882)       (2.730)  (2.867)    
Men                                
Education  9.276  10.356  1.080**    9.586  9.996  0.410    9.175  9.912  0.737** 
   (3.276)  (2.381)       (2.830)  (3.037)       (3.306)  (2.842)    
Discount rate  4.118  3.418  -0.700**    3.840  3.733  -0.107    4.341  3.673  -0.668 
   (2.813)  (2.877)       (2.812)  (2.929)       (2.855)  (2.854)    
Women                                
Education  8.703  9.799  1.096**    9.227  9.122  -0.105    7.936  9.346  1.410** 
   (2.719)  (2.991)       (2.638)  (3.142)       (2.649)  (2.881)    
Discount rate  4.005  3.930  -0.075    3.606  4.278  0.672**    4.824  3.807  -1.017** 
   (2.874)  (2.840)       (2.875)  (2.803)       (2.503)  (2.884)    
NOTE. - ** significant at 5% (t-test). Higher and lower level of accessility is divided according to the median value of the measures. 
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THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON DISCOUNT RATE: 2SLS (INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES: ACCESS TO PRIMARY AND 
SECONDARY SCHOOLS) 
   IV: Number of secondary schools    IV: Number of primary schools    IV: Number of primary and secondary schools 
Cohort effects  yes  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observable characteristics  no  no  yes  yes    no  no  yes  yes    no  no  yes  yes 
Village fixed effects  no  no  no  no    no  no  no  no    no  no  no  no 
  2SLS: Discount rate (%) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   male  female  male  female    male  female  male  female    male  female  male  female 
Education (years)  -0.600  -0.085  -0.948  -0.115    -0.702  17.132  -0.960  19.149    -0.591  -0.313  -0.948  -0.315 
   (0.234)**  (0.166)  (0.320)*** (0.162)    (0.525)  (599.749) (0.630)  (671.537)   (0.232)**  (0.180)*  (0.320)***  (0.169)* 
  First stage: Education (years) 
Number of SS  4.949  2.684  3.125  3.096                  5.611  4.335  3.398  5.022 
   (0.728)*** (1.265)*  (0.759)*** (1.101)**                 (1.032)*** (1.969)*  (1.123)**  (1.536)*** 
Number of PS                1.096  0.036  0.775  0.032    -0.679  -1.660  -0.274  -1.913 
                 (1.108)  (1.344)  (0.683)  (1.212)    (0.594)  (1.064)  (0.526)  (0.683)** 
Underidentification test (p-value)  0.070  0.227  0.069  0.150  0.422  0.977  0.372  0.977  0.021  0.213  0.093  0.081 
Weak identification test (F stat.)  46.273  4.504  16.933  7.905  0.978  0.001  1.288  0.001  18.405  2.562  9.348  6.399 
NOTE. - Standard errors corrected for clustering at village level. The lower panel reports results from the first stage regression where the dependent variable is the years of 
schooling. The upper panel shows the results for the second stage where the dependent variable is the discount rate. In columns 1-4 the instrumental variable is the number of 
secondary schools per thousand of inhabitants in the particular village area when an individual was at the age of 15 years. In columns 5-8 the instrumental variable is the 
number primary schools per thousand of inhabitants in the particular village area when an individual was at the age of 7 years. In colums 9-12 both the number of primary 
and secondary schools are used as instrumental variables. In all columns we control for cohort effects by including a dummy variable for each 5-year cohort (it equals to one 
if an individual was 7 years old in that particular period) starting from 1941-45. In columns 3-4,7-8 and 11-12 we control for observable characteristics (dummies for being 
farmer, non-farm self-employed, employed, married and having strong clan linkage).  
Underidentification test statistic is Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. The null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified, i.e. that the excluded instruments are 
uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor. Weak identification test statistic is Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. The null hypothesis is that excluded instruments are 
correlated with the endogeous regressor, but only weakly. A commonly used critical value for this test is approximately 10 (Baum et al. 2007).  
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%.
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THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON DISCOUNT RATE: 2SLS (INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE: NUMBER OF YEARS DURING AMIN’S 
ERA 1971-79) 
   IV: Number of school-age years during Amin era (1971-1979) 
Cohort effects  yes  yes    yes  yes     yes  yes    yes  yes 
Observable characteristics  no  no    yes  yes     no  no    yes  yes 
Village fixed effects  no  no    no  no     yes  yes    yes  yes 
   2SLS: Discount rate (%) 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)    (7)  (8) 
   male  female    male  female     male  female    male  female 
Education (years)  -0.636  -0.108    -1.020  -0.240     -0.575  0.043    -0.987  0.046 
   (0.288)**  (0.674)    (0.443)**  (1.056)     (0.296)*  (0.686)    (0.596)*  (1.215) 
   First stage: Education (years) 
At PS age during war (years)  -0.301  -0.120    -0.171  -0.073     -0.285  -0.122    -0.159  -0.068 
   (0.111)**  (0.113)    (0.056)**  (0.103)     (0.077)***  (0.080)    (0.060)***  (0.067) 
Underidentification (p-value)  0.053  0.281    0.026  0.453     0.000  0.119    0.007  0.294 
Weak identification (F stat.)  7.365  1.127    9.311  0.500     13.604  2.339    7.034  1.040 
NOTE. - In columns 1-4 the standard errors are corrected for clustering at village level, in columns 5-8 we control for village fixed effects. The lower panel reports results 
from the first stage regression where the dependent variable is the years of schooling. The upper panel shows the results for the second stage where the dependent variable is 
the discount rate. In all regressions the instrumental variable for education is the number of school-age years that overlap with the the era of Idi Amin (1971-1979). In all 
columns we control for cohort effects; for periods 1941-1955 and 1986-2000 we including dummies for each 5-year cohort starting from 1941-1945 and from 1986-1990, 
respectively; for the period 1956-1986 there is only one cohort dummy. In columns 3-4,7-8 and 11-12 we control for observable characteristics (dummies for being farmer, 
non-farm self-employed, employed, married and having strong clan linkage). 
Underidentification test statistic is Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. The null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified, i.e. that the excluded instruments are 
uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor. Weak identification test statistic is Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. The null hypothesis is that excluded instruments are 
correlated with the endogeous regressor, but only weakly. A commonly used critical value for this test is approximately 10 (Baum et al. 2007). 
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON DISCOUNT RATE: 2SLS (INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES: ACCESS TO SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
AND NUMBER OF YEARS DURING AMIN’S ERA 1971-79) 
 
  
IV: Access to secondary schools and number of 
school-age years during Amin era (1971-1979) 
Cohort effects  yes  yes    yes  yes 
Observable characteristics  no  no    yes  yes 
Village fixed effects  no  no    no  no 
   2SLS: Discount rate (%) 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
   male  female    male  female 
Education (years)  -0.600  -0.104    -0.962  -0.136 
   (0.205)***  (0.246)    (0.276)***  (0.214) 
   First stage: Education (years) 
Number of SS   5.095  2.862    3.129  3.249 
   (0.696)***  (1.726)    (0.732)***  (1.403)** 
At PS age during war (years)  -0.272  -0.099    -0.156  -0.050 
   (0.109)**  (0.101)    (0.054)**  (0.086) 
Underidentification (p-value)  0.097  0.506    0.046  0.386 
Weak identification (F stat.)  32.042  1.521    24.098  2.791 
NOTE. – In all columns the standard errors are corrected for clustering at village level. The lower panel reports results from the first stage regression where the dependent 
variable is the years of schooling. The upper panel shows the results for the second stage where the dependent variable is the discount rate. In all regressions the instrumental 
variables for education are (1) the number of secondary schools per thousand of inhabitants in the particular village area when an individual was at the age of 15 years and (2) 
the number of school-age years that overlap with the the era of Idi Amin (1971-1979). In all columns we control for cohort effects; for periods 1941-1955 and 1986-2000 we 
include dummies for each 5-year cohort starting from 1941-1945 and from 1986-1990, respectively; for the period 1956-1986 there is only one cohort dummy. In columns 3-
4 we control for observable characteristics (dummies for being farmer, non-farm self-employed, employed, married and having strong clan linkage). 
Underidentification test statistic is Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. The null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified, i.e. that the excluded instruments are 
uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor. Weak identification test statistic is Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. The null hypothesis is that excluded instruments are 
correlated with the endogeous regressor, but only weakly. A commonly used critical value for this test is approximately 10 (Baum et al. 2007). 
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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Table A1 
CORRELATES OF DISCOUNT RATE: ORDERED PROBIT 
Dependent variable  Discount rate 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
   all  male  female    all  male  female    all  male  female 
                                 
Education (years)  -0.067  -0.051  -0.083    -0.066  -0.052  -0.086    -0.061  -0.033  -0.088 
   (0.018)***  (0.027)*  (0.015)***    (0.022)***  (0.030)*  (0.017)***    (0.019)***  (0.027)  (0.029)*** 
Cohort effects  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes 
Observable characteristics  no  no  no    yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes 
Village fixed effects  no  no  no    no  no  no    yes  yes  no 
Observations  856  465  391    856  465  391    856  465  391 
NOTE. - For female (columns 3,6 and 9) convergence was not achieved; the reported results are after fifth iteration. In columns 1-6, standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the village level. In columns 7-9, village fixed effects are included. In all columns we control for cohort effects by including a dummy variable for each 5-year 
cohort (it equals to one if an individual was 7 years old in that particular period) starting from 1941-45.In columns 4-9 we control for observable characteristics (dummies for 
being farmer, non-farm self-employed, employed, married and having strong clan linkage). 
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%.
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